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The Concept of "Law"
By VniEmm

AUBERT*

The growing concern with legal-sociological problems1 has
one of its origins in the philosophy of law of recent years. Modem
philosophy of law has had much the same function in relation to
legal sociology as did epistemology relative to the growth of
psychology and symbolic logic. 2 When sociological studies of law
are today becoming more prevalent, it is no doubt due to the
particular bent of certain schools in modem philosophy of law.
They have brought the problems of philosophical analysis to a
point where they seem, almost inevitably, to require aid from
sociology or social psychology. This is especially striking in
recent analyses of the concept "valid law" and its synonyms, as
they have been performed by philosophers of an empirical or
logical-analytical inclination. In the United States this work has
mostly been carried out by lawyers turned philosophers, often
lumped together under the heading 'legal realism." In Scandinavia some of the same basic themes have been running through
the debates in legal philosophy. In this debate have participated
lawyers of a philosophical bent, as well as philosophers turned
lawyers. The two major names are Hiigerstr6m, the Swedish
philosopher, one of the founders of the so-called "Uppsalaphilosophy,"3 and the Danish lawyer Ross.4 A brief survey of the
analytical problems arising around the concept of 'law" and of
some major attempts to solve these problems along philosophical
lines may be helpful to a deeper understanding of the sociological
problems arising out of a concern with judicial behavior.
The terms "law," "valid legal rule," "right," etc. belong to the
more difficult in our language. They are full of ambiguities.
* University of Oslo.
lCf. Schubert, Political Research in the Sociology of Law (a paper presented
at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Ass'n in Washington, D. C.,

1962).

23 Nmss,Fflosofiske Problemer (1939).

Hdgerstr6m, Inquires into the Nature of Law and Morals (Broad transl.
1953).
4 Cf. Ross, On Law and Justice (1958).
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Whenever one appears close to some settlement of the terminological debate, one can be sure to be met with contradictory
terminological suggestions from one source or another. Now, of
course, most terms in the colloquial language are ambiguous.
What is, then, the source of the very special troubles arising
around the terms "valid law," 'legal rule," etc.? Why have the
innumerable attempts to arrive at the definition of "law" not met
with success, but, on the contrary, rather tended to intensify the
confusion?
In brief, I believe that the fundamental source of these
difficulties lies in man's wish that the law should be something
which is, in the empirical sense, as well as something which ought
to be, on the normative level. On the one hand, the law is something to be found in code books, in the practice of the courts, and
in the behavior and attitudes of the citizens. On the other hand,
law should be an expressions of ideals, of something we value.
Since there may often be a discrepancy between the state of
affairs which is being upheld by legislators, judges and police,
and the ideals which appeal to us, there is bound to arise some
tension in the use of these basic legal concepts.
A few examples may illustrate the essential ambivalence in
our attitude towards the concept of "law." It has been very
common during and after the last war to speak about "our fight
for the law" as a fundamental aspect of the Norwegian resistance
to the German occupation. Here it is quite clear that the terms
do not refer to just any legal system, upheld in the empirical
sense, or any order of stable social power. The resistance
purported to be a fight for certain ideals of law, against certain
others, embodied in Nazi ideology. Speaking about "States of
Law," something more is intended than the mere existence of
rules being enforced regularly by courts disposing of society's
resources of power and force. Ordinarily this term seems to
imply the existence of certain guarantees of individual life, liberty,
perhaps even property. "Law" in these contexts has very definite
moral overtones.
Take on the other hand the case where the rich man or the
bank instigates bankruptcy proceedings against the small peasant,
because of his inability to pay his rent or debt. In such a case
it may be claimed that "the bank has the law on its side." But
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this will be claimed without enthusiasm. Nothing more will
usually be intended than that this is the way particular code
sections have to be interpreted, and this is the way the courts are
likely to decide such cases. Saying that the law is on the side of
the creditor refers to purely empirical phenomena: this is the way
such cases end. Many will feel that it ought to be quite different,
at least in the particular case.
The ambiguities and ambivalences attaching to the concept
of "valid law" and similar terms are not uniquely associated with
our time and modem industrial society. It seems that there have
always been struggles around the concept of law. And as is so
often the case with terminological disputes, it is also here concerned with something else, and more important. The fight
about the correct definition of "law" is often no more than a
preliminary skirmish. Behind it there is being prepared a struggle
over ideology, politics or money. It is this background which
makes the struggle over terms and definitions such a fascinating
subject of inquiry.5
The term "law" has acquired a strongly positive emotive
meaning, somewhat independent of empirical referents.' If the
term is being applied to an action, in itself commendable and
good, it takes on increased positive value. And, if the term can be
applied to behavior of morally dubious status, it tends to make
at least for acquiescence with the state of affairs. Language is a
powerful weapon, and not only because of its content. It is very
important for all propagandists to attach the term "valid law"
to that particular state of affairs in which they believe. They can
do so by ordinary political means, by influencing legislation,
possibly recruitment to the law-enforcing agencies. But there
exists in addition to this long and laborious route, a philosophical
"short-cut." Through legal-philosophical analyses it is possible
to pull the concept of law in one direction or another, corresponding to basic cleavages of ideology or interests in society.
Even if the term "law" has acquired independent emotive
meaning, it is tied to certain facts which cannot be completely
ignored in the analysis. About good and evil it seems possible
GOfstad, The Descriptive Definition of the Concept "Legal Norm" Proposed
by Hans Kelson, 1950 Theoria 16, 118-162, 211-246.
0 Stevenson, Ethics and Language (1944).
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to debate almost without restrictions. No counter proof is likely
to be produced. Discussing the law, there is also considerable
room for private opinion, but not that much. Considerations for
empirical phenomena are bound to enter on a variety of specific
points.
How the two concerns for the empirical power-relationships

and for the ideals and values may clash has been strikingly illustrated by the Greek historian and military commander Xenophon,
reporting an alleged conversation between Pericles and Alci7
biades:
It is said that Alcibiades, before he was twenty, had a conversation on the subject of law with Pericles, his guardian and
head of the government, somewhat as follows:
"Tell me, Pericles," he said, "could you explain to me what
a law is?"
"Why of course," said Pericles.
"Then for Heaven's sake explain it," said Alcibiades, "for
when I hear people praised for being law-abiding I have
the idea that a man couldn't rightly be accorded this
praise if he didn't know what a law is."
"Well, what you want is nothing difficult, Alcibiades," said
Pericles, "wishing to know what a law is. Why all these
are laws which the people in assembly approve and enact,
setting forth what is or is not to be done."
"With the idea that good is to be done, or bad?"
"Good, by Jove, my boy, and not bad," said Pericles.
"But if it is not the people, but, as in an aligarchic state,
a minority who assemble and enact what is or is not to be
done, what is this?"
"Everything," said Pericles, "that the sovereign power in
the state enacts with due deliberation, enjoining what is to
be done, is termed a law."
"And if a despot, then, holding the sovereign power in the
state, enacts rules for the citizens, enjoining what is to be
done, is this, too, law?"
"Yes, everything that a despot, as ruler," said Pericles, "enacts, this, too, is termed a law."
"But force," said Alcibiades, "and lawlessness, what are
they, Pericles? Is it not when a stronger compels a weaker
to do his will, not by getting his consent but by force?"
7 Calhoun, Greek Legal Science 78-80 (1947).

19641

TAE CONCEPT OF "LAW"

"That is my idea," said Pericles.
"Then everything a despot compels the citizens to do by his
enactments, without getting their consent, is lawlessness?"
"That is right," said Pericles. "I retract the statement that
anything a despot enacts, without the consent of the
citizens, is law."
"But anything the minority enact, not getting the consent of
the majority but through superior power, shall we call this
force or shall we not?"
"Anything, I think," said Pericles, "that anyone compels another to do without getting his consent, whether by enactment or otherwise, is force rather than law."
"Then anything that the whole people, by reason of being
stronger than the well-to-do, enact without getting consent,
would be force rather than law?"
"Let me tell you," said Pericles, "Alcibiades, when I was
your age I too was go6d at this sort of thing. For we used
to practice just the sort of clever quibbling I think you are
practising now."
And Alcibiades said, "I should like to have met you in
those days, Pericles, when you were at your best."
The conversation suggests that Pericles originally assumed
'law" to be inseparable from the actually existing power-relationships, provided that certain forms are observed. But as the questioning of Alcibiades makes him realize the consequences of his
views, doubts arise. It turns out that he is unwilling to apply the
noble term "law" or 'legal rule" to just any exertion of power,
even though it may conform to formally established rules. Pericles
seems to demand certain minimal standards of content to be
fulfilled if the term "law" is to be applicable to a certain state of
affairs. If they are not fulfilled he prefers to speak about "force"
or "coercion" rather than of "law."
It is for good reasons that Pericles, and with him many modern
lawyers, take an established order of power as their starting point,
that is to say, rules given by legislators and enforced by courts.
The tasks of the lawyer demand rapid solutions to problems of
law, even though the problems may be very complex. A moral
debate about good and evil in the case might be without end.
Arguments concerning what is stated in the laws and established
as judicial precedent are, after all, easier to terminate and less
laden with affects.
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Also sound scientific reasons favor a definition of "law" in
terms of empirical facts, rules enforced and abided by in any
one society. If we speak about law as ideal, as something which
ought to be, the statements can not be directly and fully tested
through a confrontation with empirical data. And yet, even those
who are most eager to deal with legal rules in a purely scientific,
objective manner will soon realize the difficulties in being consistent. Legal scholars are both observers and participants in the
system which they study. As observers they may refer to the law
as something purely factual. As participants such legal "purists"
would in practice and in the consequences of their work become
unfree and one-sided apologists for the status quo.
The term "law" is a slogan and a battle-cry. Everybody is in
favor of the "law," as they are against the sin. Therefore also
professional users of the term will feel a continuous temptation
to apply it to the standards in which they personally believe,
even should they not be quite clearly expressed in the law or in
the practice of the courts. Sooner or later they will be placed in
the same situation as was Pericles. They will face rules which are
actually being enforced by the proper authorities, but which
seem so reprehensible as to make for great hesitancy in the use
of the term "law," even for a person with a good grasp of the facts
of legal life. However firmly the definition of 'law" links the concept to a set of empirical facts, the desire to break through the
empirical limitation will persist in some people, even in some
lawyers. This tension between the empirical and the normative
in the legal realm will hardly ever disappear completely. It seems
realistic to reckon with a certain ambiguity and inconsistency in
the use of the term "law" and its synonyms. This inconsistency is
in no small measure protected, often veiled, by the manifold and
complicated structure of legal phenomena.
All the doubts and uncertainties arising from the realities of
legal life have made some believe that the ambiguities of legal
rules, the lack of proper precedents, etc. are no more than symtoms of our inadequate knowledge. Behind this changing, inconsistent and incomplete law, there exists another law. And this law
is comprehensive, certain and consistent, furnishing precise rules
for the solution of all conflicts. It is only in part, perhaps not at
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all, the product of human actions. In a way it is placed above the
citizens, above the judges, yes even above the legislator.
The belief in a law of this kind has throughout historical time
played an important part. It has occurred in many garbs, serving
many different functions. As a belief in Natural Law, emanating
from God, it served in some periods as a mighty weapon in the
hands of the Catholic church opposing secular authority. As a
belief in the natural rights of man it has inflammed revolutionaries to attack the existing order of law and power. And the
pendulum swung once more, so that the American Supreme Court
for a long time used the rights of man as a device for protecting
the vested interests of the capitalist class. Today, the rights of
man are invoked by the courts in defense of the Negro.
On a more pedestrian level, the faith in a law beyond the
follies of man has given many people a sense of security. Positive
law, law as fact, has lacunae and inconsistencies, and is beset
with uncertainties concerning the future legal status of an individual. The belief in the complete and certain law behind the
law we actually observe may serve some of the same function as
faith in providence, distracting the attention from that uncertainty which is all pervasive within the realm of law.
The Legal Realism of ScandinavianPhilosophy of Law
Some philosophers of law have attempted to define the concept of "valid law" in such a way that it refers purely to facts.
These proposals for a stricter terminology do hardly accord with
the actual use of terms within law, and can hardly expect to
achieve widespread support. Nevertheless, some of these definitions merit our attention, for they establish an apparent link
between dogmatic legal theory and the emergent sociology of law.
Let us start with a brief consideration of one definition which
ties the concept of law to a certain type of empirical data: the
legal beliefs of the citizens. In his book Codes and Law the
Danish jurist Ilium states: "A rule is not a legal rule simply
because it has come about as a product of a social mechanism
which has found its expression in the founding of a state.
Those rules which are produced in this manner become law only
by becoming an intergral part of the people's common legal
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beliefs."' Now, Illum holds the opinions of lawyers to be the
most important source of information concerning the content of
these legal beliefs. But he makes it clear that conformity to the
convictions also of lay-people affected by the rules in question, is
a necessary condition for the validity of said rules. Ilium is fully
aware of the consequence of this definition, that there exists no
uniform legal conviction with respect to any rule. "One searches
for the law, but finds only the specific beliefs of specific people
concerning the contents of the legal system. There are as many
varieties of law as there exist legal convictions."9
There is no doubt that this definition of law directs attention
and thought to an interesting social phenomenon, and to one
which is central in modern sociology of law. However, likidng
the concept of "law" by definition to people's beliefs makes for a
radical breach with common usage of terms within legal theory.
Thus, it seems highly improbable that one could stick consistently to such a definition throughout the analysis of the
validity of specific rules and decisions. There is serious danger
that this definition will remain no more than an apparently
sociological mask to a method which is dogmatic and traditional,
the conclusions of which are unaffected by empirical opinion
research.
The point of view adopted by Ilium in such an extreme form,
has also been maintained by Alf Ross in his earlier work. In his
earlier phase it seems as if the conformity of the citizens' behaviour to rules was a necessary condition for the validity of
these rules as law. If the behavior of the people deviated massively from the rules they could not make claim to legal validity.
At the same time Ross demanded that the obedience of the
citizens be based upon motives of a certain disinterested kind, if
it were to be interpreted as evidence for the validity of rules. 10
Illum, and Ross in his earlier works, developed concepts of
"valid law" which have a democratic orientation.' As we have
seen already, this orientation in defining the concept of "valid
law" has traditions as far back as to the alleged debate between
8Tum, Lov og ret 53 (1945).

9Id. at 56.

10

Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence 89-90 (1946).

11 Cf. Ofstad, Om Deskriptive Definisionerav Begrepet Rettsregel, 1952 Tids-

skrift for Rettsvidenskap 65.
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Pericles and Alcibiades. It has later recurred from time to time.
Today, however, other types of "realistic" definitions of law loom
larger in the legal philosophical debates. They can perhaps be
said to have a more authoritarian orientation in so far as they
attempt to anchor the concept of law in the legal enforcement
machinery, or more specifically, in judicial opinion and behavior.12
Within Scandinavian philosophy of law, the Uppsala philosophers especially have sought a definition of 'law" along these
lines. The leading representatives of this school of thought,
Hdigerstrbm and Lundstedt, arrived at first at the conclusion that
terms like "valid law," "right," "obligation" have no empirical
referents. To use such terms was characterized as metaphysics,
13
and as such unworthy of endeavors making scientific claims.
At the same time as they maintained this point of view they
suggested that legal terms could be given a meaning so as to have
them refer to empirical invariances, namely invariances in the
behavior of the law-enforcing agencies.' 4 Unequivocally this
point of view was first held by Ingemar Hedenius. He states that
"the validity of a rule means that it is in fact enforced. A valid
rule of law can be nothing but a rule of behavior which is
actually being enforced, a habit which, by and large, is being
exercised by certain persons of authority."' 5 He makes this more
precise by saying:
That something is contrary to law, that a right or an obligation
exists, is synonymous with claiming that certain rules of law
have validity with respect to specific cases. That a rule of law
is valid means that it is a rule of behavior, which is actually
being applied by certain persons of authority, appointed for
this purpose. Thus, the validity of the specific rule of law is
synonymous with the existence of an empirical regularity in
human behavior. This is always a question of behavior on the
part of legal authorities. Regularities in the behavior of other
persons, or of legal authorities outside their field of public
authority, cannot acquire the status of a legal rule. 16
12

Ibid.

13Hdgerstrm, Till Frdgam om Bgreppet Gidilande Rdtt, 1931 Tidsskrift for

Rettsvidenskapp
44, 83, 86; 2 Lundstedt, Obligationsbegreppet 92 (1930).
4
1 H.gerstrom, supra note 13, at 84; 2 Lundstedt, op. cit. supra note 13, at 91.
'5Hedenus, Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy 87 (1936).
16 d. at 89.
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Hedenius makes it quite clear that the term "valid law" refers
to purely empirical phenomena, and that these facts have to do
with the behavior of agents of public authority. This definition
is clearly at variance with Mum's point of view, that the concept
of "valid law" presupposes the existence of regularly occurring
opinions and actions on part of the citizens.

Alf Ross and the "Valid Law"
The Scandinavian philosopher of law, who with the greatest
penetration and consistency, has tried to anchor the concept of
"valid law" in purely empirical phenomena, is Alf Ross.17 He has
also attempted, but probably not succeeded, in preserving the
terminological usages within jurisprudence. We shall here deal
with some of his claims concerning the definition of "valid law"
and investigate how they relate to a sociological study of law, or
more specifically, to sociological studies of judicial behavior.
Ross attempts to preserve the bonds with the traditional study
of law. His unwillingness to sever the ties with this traditional
field of study appears already in his attitude to the function of
legal philosophy. He defines legal philosophy as a discipline
aiming at a study of jurisprudence itself. The problem of the
nature of law is, deprived of its metaphysical formulation, the
problem of the interpretation of the concept of "valid law" as an
integral part of every doctrinal legal sentence. Nevertheless it
may be somewhat doubtful if Ross's analysis of the concept of
valid law is to be interpreted as an attempt to analyse the actual
usage within jurisprudence, or if it should not at the same time
be interpreted as a kind of suggestion concerning the most fruitful use of the concepts. In my view there is in Ross a mixture of
these two attitudes.
Like the Uppsala philosophers, Ross is oriented towards the
activities of persons in positions of authority when he defines the
concept of valid law. But he defines it in a more refined way than
these other philosophers had done, in my view also in a more
sophisticated manner than most of the American legal realists.
Ross defines the concept of law in these words:
A national law system, considered as a valid system of norms,
can accordingly be defined as the norms which actually are
17 Ross, On Law and Justice (London ed. 1958).
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operative in the mind of the judge, because they are felt by
him to be socially binding and therefore obeyed. The test of
the validity is that on this hypothesis-that is, accepting the
system of norms as a scheme of interpretation-we can comprehend the actions of the judge [the decisions of the courts]
as meaningful responses to given conditions and within certain
limits predict them in the same way as the norms of chess
enable us to understand the moves of the players as meaningful responses and predimt them. 18
And he emphasizes once more that the judge is the central figure
in this theory:
Only the legal phenomena in the narrower sense, however
-the application of the law by the courts-are decisive in
determining the validity of the legal norms. In contrast to
generally accepted ideas it must be emphasised that the law
provides the norms for the behavior of the courts, and not of
private individuals. The effectiveness which conditions the
validity of the norms can therefore be sought solely in the
judicial application of the law, and not in the law in action
among private individuals. If, for example, criminal abortion
is prohibited, the true content of the law consists in a directive
to the judge that he shall under certain conditions impose a
penalty for criminal abortion. The decisive factor determining
that the prohibition is valid law is solely the fact that it is
effectively upheld by the courts where breaches of the law are
brought to light and prosecuted. It makes no difference
whether the people comply with or frequently ignore the
prohibition. This indifference results in the apparent paradox
that the more effectively a rule is complied with in extrajudicial legal life, the more difficult it is to ascertain whether
the rule possesses validity, because the courts have that much
less opportunity to manifest their reaction. 19
Ross deviates from the American legal realism in so far as he is
unable to accept the statement that law should be no more than
what the courts do in fact. What Ross claims that one can
predict on the basis of statements about valid law is not what the
judge in the end will do to a case. The final decision is
determined by many different factors, including the temperament
and state of mind of the judge. In Ross's view it is no task for
the theory of valid law to make statements on such individual
18 Id. at 85.
Ibid.

'9
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properties of judges. It is solely concerned with that ideology
which is motivating in the mind of the judge when he makes his
decision. According to the explication of the validity of law given
in this paragraph, this concept rests on hypotheses concerning
the mind of the judge. What is valid law cannot be behavioristically observed, that is to say, not by external observations of
invariances in the reactions of the judges.
Ross discusses how doctrinal statements on valid law are to be
verified, and he makes this proclamation:
The real content of the assertion
A-section 62 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act is
valid law at the present time of a certain state is a prediction
to the effect that if an action in which the conditioning facts
given in the section are considered to exist is brought before
the courts of this state, and if in the meantime there have been
no alterations in the circumstances which forms the basis of
A, the directive to the judge contained in the section will form
an integral part of the reasoning underlying the judgement.
A is regarded as being true if we have
good reason to
20
assume that this prediction will be fulfilled.
These quotations from the definition of "valid law" in Ross'
theory might suggest that he is attempting to transform the
doctrinal study of law into a kind of sociology, or at least into a
social science of a new type, a pure empirical science. But other
statements made by Ross create a certain scepticism with respect
to the compatibility of jurisprudence in the traditional sense, with
sociological research on legal phenomena. Ross begins by speaking about the ideology which lives in the mind of the judge.
However, when he deals with the more concrete questions of
verification he talks about the premises of the decision. This is in
many ways more practical. It is easier to study the opinions of
the court than to investigate motivation. There is, however, a
great difference between the grounds given in the opinions of the
court and the actual psychological motivation. We would not
expect the ideology to be similar in two judges, one of which uses
a certain argument simply as a rationalization, the other one
using it because it is his firm belief. If one pretends to be able
to make statements on motivation and on the state of mind of the
201d. at 40.
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judge, it is necessary to be able to draw a distinction between two
such states of affairs.
Also another point in the analysis of the question of verification merits serious attention. Ross discusses the possibility that
doctrinal statements of valid law may influence the behavior of
the courts, thus becoming self-fulfilling. A legal scholar who has
identified himself with the ideology of the courts, and who then
on the basis of his own evaluation makes "forecasts," stands a good
chance of having them verified by the courts precisely because
he put them forward. Doctrinal studies can therefore not in
21
principle be distinguished from legal policy.

This may be true. But when Ross claims that doctrinal law in
this respect is similar to the other social sciences, it is probably
not correct. He states quite generally that in the social sciences
it is, in principle, impossible to make a sharp distinction between
theory and political action. He exemplifies this with a reference
to a concrete forecast made in the Berlin conflict in 1950, a forecast which had practical consequences which in their turn
influenced the truth of the prediction. He further mentions that
the predictions of a price increase may lead to an increase in
prices, simply by being believed in, even if it originally was poorly
founded on facts. This situation may in principle be similar to
the situation in law. The examples are, however, hardly representative of the social sciences, and certainly not of sociology or
social psychology. Within these fields it belongs to the rare
exceptions that concrete predictions are being made available to
the subjects of research which the theories concern. In doctrinal
studies of law on the other hand, it is a very common situation
if we take Ross' view on valid law as our point of departure. In
this very important difference, at least of degree, we find an
explanation of Ross' reluctance to open up for methods of verification that are current in modem sociology. Doctrinal studies of
law are-and have to be-influenced by the fact that their statements are to be used by attorneys and by judges whose task it is
to reach decisions in concrete cases. For this reason a realistic
legal theorist may calculate with the prestige of his own science
as a factor in predictions, while this is something which a sociologist or a social psychologist rarely or never does in his theo21 Id. at 48.
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retical work. The role of the sociologist is very different from
that of the lawyer.
Let me terminate these considerations with a repetition of
how Ross purports to verify the predictions of legal science concerning the normative ideology living in the mind of the judge.
He wants to do so by studying the opinions of the court. In so
doing he limits himself to a method of verification which is very
narrow from a sociological or a social psychological point of view,
since we are apparently dealing with the motivation and psychological structure of the judge. In reality it seems that this
method is so limited that it once more will make the concept of
valid law a term covering no more than certain written formulations and no social psychological entities at all. It is not
possible at the same time to make the statements psychologically
more interesting and easy to verify. In the process of verification
Ross relies upon the "self-fulfilling prophecy" as an aid in fields
where forecasts are uncertain. In doing so he creates a distance
between doctrinal studies of law and the problem of verification
as it is being found and discussed in the other social sciences.
Let us leave the question of verification and take a look at the
formation of hypotheses. By the aid of what kinds of methods can
doctrinal lawyers collect and analyse data with a view to make
reliable predictions? An important point of departure in Ross'
theory is the theory of sources of law. Within his theoretical
system this becomes a theory of how judges act, or of ideologies
which as a matter of fact, exist in the minds of judges.2 2 This notwithstanding, Ross' theory of sources of law contains the same
elements which we find in other theories of sources of law. He
does not add significant new material, even if it proclaims to be
purely descriptive, and not like many others, wholly or in part
normative in character. Statute, precedent and custom are the
most important sources of law. That is to say that these three
types of factual material must be known and analysed by those
who want to predict anything concerning the activities of judges.
In principle it is being claimed that these phenomena only are of
importance in relation to valid law when they enter into the mind
of the judge. Nevertheless, one is in practice led by Ross' theory
of sources of law to study them as phenomena outside the mind
"2 Id. at 75.
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of the judge. This is probably the most practical. The question
is then if it is not a fiction that this kind of study is social psychology with the mind of the judge as its subject matter.
Let me use an analogy with animal psychology to illustrate
this aspect of the theory of sources of law of Ross. A psychologist
studying learning will hardly consider it to be an independent
task of research to describe the objective characteristics of the
rat's environment. The corridors of the maze and the objective
properties of goals interest him merely because he has to know
them as a background for the choice behavior of the rat when
faced with this particular environmental structure. It seems to
me that Ross-like other lawyers-mostly refers to this very complicated maze of external stimuli within which the judge moves
during the hearings in court. It is probably most practical to do
so. But it would be a fiction to believe that the subject matter of
such a kind of research is the mind or psyche of the judge. The
hypotheses concerning the mind of the judge fall victim to the
methodological principle of "Occam's razor." They add to the
number of premises beyond those that are logically necessary in
order to arrive at the conclusions.
Now, the relationship between the rat and the psychologist
is not the same as that between the judge and the theoretical
jurist. The theoretical jurist is somewhat closer to the judge than
the psychologist is to the rat. But even human psychologists
would not dare to trust a method where he exclusively studied
the environment of his subjects, and then made predictions of
behavior on the basis of an intuitive understanding of the
situation, without having made investigations of the psyche of
his subjects. But this is what legal theory does according to Ross.
When it turns out fairly well it is due to the fact that the judicial
decision is one of the most "maze-influenced" actions in social
life. The external obligations of the judge are exceedingly finely
carved out. Furthermore, the success of legal theory is to a large
extent based upon the communality between the judge and the
theorist. They know much about the same things, and they talk
the same language, based upon their common education. It is
important, however, to retain that this is the basis of accurate
statements concerning valid law, and not that the researcher has
any clearly formulated knowledge of the mind of the judge. The
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situation here has rarely any genuine parallels in the other social
sciences. To range the existing legal theory among the other
social sciences may becloud more than it clarifies.
The ambiguity of references to the judge or his environment
(in this case a set of rules in books) need not affect the accuracy
of predictions where the three central sources of law dominate.
Tremendous problems arise, however, on two peripheral points.
It is the so-called "empty fields" where the judge is unable to
reach a decision without going beyond these sources of law. And
the same is the case when the ambiguity of the statutes makes it
hard to determine exactly what they express. These two questions
put the system of Ross to its decisive test.
Within the areas empty of law it was earlier quite common
for the theory to refer to a source of law which was called "reason." Instead of this Ross introduces a source of law which he
calls the "cultural tradition."28 As a source of law the cultural
tradition is a set of empirical facts that can be used as a basis for
making predictions concerning the motivation of the courts in
concrete cases. But here the problem becomes very acute of
where the factors are to be observed-within or outside the mind
of the judge.
Ross outlines no systematic method for the study of the
cultural tradition as a part of the psyche of the judge. Instead
he refers to the concept of culture within sociology or rather
anthropology, as it has been developed for instance by Ruth
Benedict in Patterns of Culture.24 Apart from this, however, he
uses only some, necessarily rather loose, conceptions concerning
what culture is. They furnish no basis for those who are searching
for factors on which one can build predictions. It seems that,
actually, the cultural tradition is no more than a new name for
the great unknown in law, that unknown that previously sailed
under other flags. The new term does not increase our knowledge,
and what is worse, it suggests no useful methods by which to
proceed.
If one went to the sociology of culture in search of material, I
believe the following would happen: On the basis of available
knowledge concerning our culture, it would be possible to predict
at 97.
241d.at 98.
23 Id.
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a considerable number of legal decisions. But, by and large,
these would belong among the more trivial questions of law. The
uncertain and complex question of law are on the other hand
such where traditions and massive group attitudes are lacking.
I should think that it would, as a rule, be precisely these kinds of
questions which have not got, and will not get, any very specific
cultural definition nor a very definite cultural integration. It is an
arbitrary assumption to believe that the solution of very complex
juridical questions should remain in a state of cultural harmony.
To assume so would mean a transfer of an extreme functionalism,
which may be untenable even in its cruder form, to the finest pegs
of the social machinery.
This does not mean, of course, that the judge is unaffected by
the cultural traditions when he decides in accordance with the
so-called "reason." But it is of little avail to know that it is so,
in part, because as mentioned, our knowledge of these common
cultural traditions are very crude and vague. In part it is also due
to the fact that the judge and the lawyers live in their own
subculture which does not in detail coincide with that of society
at large. Besides, we have no reason to assume that judges are
quite uniformly ideologically motivated within these difficult
areas of the law.25
We face a choice between accepting an empty reference to the
sociology of culture or to choose a method for investigation of the
motivation of the judge. Ross chooses the former and with the
unfortunate consequences mentioned above. However, the other
solution might not present a fruitful approach either. It would
namely imply an attempt to study these very subtle deliberations
and choice activities with methods that have been adapted to very
different tasks.
I think one must, and ought to, capitulate in the face of this
problem of prediction. It is, on the other hand, no doubt true that
legal theory in these areas have influenced the practice of the
courts. But this is of little avail in those instances where two
theoretical jurists establish each their own rule on the basis of
their conception of the nature of the case. The scientific debate
25 Cf. Schubert, Political Research in the Sociology of Law (a paper presented
at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Ass'n in Washington, D. C.,
1962).
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between these two can not be conducted as a debate about which
one has the greatest prestige, and will therefore most likely be
adhered to by the courts. As a rule it will not turn into a debate
on predictions, and it will not be a debate merely about norms,
but a debate within a normative system. In so far as this is so,
legal analysis is no pure social science at all. Not only will the
debate have a certain normative character, but the empirical
statements made will necessarily have rather shallow foundations.
The whole problem surrounding the concept of "reason" springs
out of a purely practical need, the necessity for the court of
reaching decisions in all cases. One can not expect fruitful research to emerge from the attempts to find immediate solutions
to a vast number of practical problems. It is important to be
aware that the difference, albeit one of degree, between the treatment of "reason" within law and the methods of social psychology,
is very great.
The problem of the motivation of the judge emerges in an
even clearer form in connection with the interpretation of
statutes and the application of the law. Ross emphasizes how
theoretical knowledge and practical choice, on the basis of the
personality and social attitudes of the judge, are inextricably
woven together in his motivation.26 This again raises the
question of how fruitful Ross' concept of law is. Doctrinal statements are to be verified by the opinion of the court. Therefore
the method of verification excludes very important normative
factors, not to be read out of the written records. This is of less
importance, however. It is also unclear how large a part of the
motivation of the judge belongs within the domain of valid law.
More important, however, is the question whether it at all exists
any method of studying those aspects of judicial motivation which
Ross deals with under the interpretation of statutes. What are
these methods?
Some of the methods of interpretation turn out to be identical
with those applied by judges and other lawyers. Therefore, and
because the judges read juridical literature, the interpretations of
legal theory will often be reaffirmed by the courts. But are these
interpretations for that reason statements about the motivation
of judges? If this is more than a fiction, this will be revealed in
26

Ross, op. cit. supra note 4, at 151.
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those instances where the interpretations are uncertain and where
the accepted doctrinal methods are vague and unsystematic.
Does the point of view of Ross, emphasizing predictions, make
any new contribution in this area?
That would presumably appear in his discussion of the socalled "pragmatic" factors in the interpretation. Here the personality of the judge enters seriously into the analysis. Ross makes
this statement among others:
The constructive part played by the judge in the administration of justice to define more precisely or to correct the
directive of the statute is only rarely manifest. Usually the
judge will not admit that his interpretation is of this constructive character, but attempt by a technique of argumentation, to make it appear that his decision was arrived at objectively and is covered by the "meaning of the statute" or the
"intention of the legislator." He will try thus for his own
benefit, or at least for the benefit of the rest of the world, to
uphold the image discussed in § 28-showing the administration of justice as determined solely by the motive of obedience
to the law in combination with a rational insight into the
meaning of the statute or the will of the legislator.
When the combined motivating factors-the wording of the
statute, the pragmatic considerations, the estimation of the
facts-have produced their effect in the judge's mind and influenced him in favour of a decision, then a facade of justification is constructed, often differing2 from that which in reality
made him decide the way he did. 7
And he goes on to say, "The secret of this technique of argumentation lies in the fact that no criterion exists indicating which
rule of interpretation to use."28
Ross further emphasizes that it is an interesting social psychological problem why the realities have to be veiled by the use
of such a technique of argumentation. He suggests that the
veiling perhaps may be socially useful. But he also states that
such a beclouding, of truth is not appropriate for science. If the
interpretations have no basis in precedent, Ross believes that
these patterns of arguments must not be presented as statements
on valid law. "The task of doctrinal law is to make clear the
assumed evaluations, to clarify the considerations and analyze
27 Id.

at 151-152.
281d. at 153n.
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social facts and relationships, thereby giving to the courts some
advice which they may use when they create law through
29
constructive interpretation."

This is certainly a sensible attitude to the task of legal theory,
which is, however, quite different from making predictions or
studying the psychology of judges. Ross is fully aware that an
important part of legal science is political, and does not attempt
to enunciate valid law. Nevertheless a curious aspect of his
system appears here. As long as the judges are receptive, automatic receivers of external stimuli, legal theory is in principle a
kind of description of judicial behavior, based upon social psychological hypotheses. When, however, the external framework
is less restrictive, legal theory is no longer prediction, but turns
into advice. To make a caricature, it reminds one of a theory of
architecture which pretends to be psychology when it describes
where the walls, the corridors, the stairs, the floors, etc. are, because it is fairly certain that people are bound to walk up the
stairs and not up through the floor, that they will enter through
the doors and usually not through the windows or the walls. But
when the theory has to describe what goes on within any one
room, it must capitulate, because this is not unequivocally determined by the architectural structure.
In the same way it appears that the moment the external
legal architecture no longer compellingly determines a certain
result, that is, when the personality of the judge enters, it becomes
clear that Ross has talked about the psyche of the judge without
disposing of any useful method to study it. Now, the judge is
placed within a more solid and better known architecture than
most people are. For that reason the gap between the terminology
of Ross and his operational methods appears only on certain
crucial points.
I do not believe that one could successfully develop a psychological science of prediction concerning difficult problems of
interpretation of laws. It may be doubted that this would, in the
end, serve a useful function. Scientifically speaking, it is hardly
more fruitful than if a physicist started in detail to record all
the traces followed by the balls in the game of bowling. This
29

Boss, Om Bet og Refferdighed 183 (Danish ed. 1953).
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objection to Ross' theory points back to the analysis of the
concept of valid law. It seems that he has assumed daring
scientific and philosophical attitudes from which he has later
been forced to retreat. Since the decision to retreat appears
sensible, there must be some fault with the original position.
What is false, or at least one-sided, must be the general attitude to what makes a presentation scientific. There are not
many explicit statements on this question in Ross' treatise. He
claims, however, in one place:
It is a principle of modem empirical science that a proposition about reality [in contrast to an analytical, logical-mathematical proposition] must imply that by following a certain
mode of procedure, under certain conditions certain direct
experiences will result. The proposition for example, "this
is chalk" implies that if I place the object under a microscope
certain structural qualities shall appear; if I pour acid over it,
certain chemical reactions will result; if I rub it on a blackboard a line will show, and so on. This mode of procedure is
called the procedure of verification and the sum of verifiable
implications is said to constitute the "real content" of the
proposition. If an assertion-for example, the assertion that
the world is governed by an invisible demon-does not involve
any verifiable implications, it is said to be without logical
meaning; as "metaphysical" it is banned from the realm of
science.
The interpretation of the doctrinal study of law presented
in this book rests upon the postulate that the principle of
verification must apply also to this field of cognition-that the
doctrinal study of law must be recognized as an empirical
social science. This means that the propositions about valid
law must be interpreted as referring not to an unobservable
validity or "binding force" derived from a priori principles or
postulates but to social facts. It must be made clear in what
procedure the doctrinal propositions can be verified; or what
their verifiable implications are.
Our interpretation, based on the preceding analysis, is that
the real content of doctrinal propositions refers to the actions
of the courts under certain conditions. The real content, for
example, of the proposition that section 62 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act is valid Illinois law is the assertion
that under certain conditions the courts of this state will act
in accordance with the tenor of this section. This tenor is a
directive to the judge to order the drawee to pay the bill
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which he has accepted but failed to pay on the day it fell

due (§ 7).30

Ross' concept of science has this in common with the Uppsala
philosophy and many other representatives of positivism, that it
is established with the main purpose to distinguish science from
evaluation, from preaching and metaphysics. This distinction has
often been veiled within the area of legal and moral philosophy.
By and large I can subscribe to Ross' demand that the truth-value
of scientific expositions must be testable by experience. It must
on the other hand be clearly stated that testability is only one of
the criteria of science. Not all presentations which contain true
statements, even solely true statements, are "science" in the real
sense of the term.
It is true as Ross claims that a scientist has to be cautious so
as not to fall into the abyss called "metaphysics," evaluation and
untestable theories. On the other side of the narrow path of
science, however, there is another abyss. And we fall into that
if we are satisfied with presenting trivial and disconnected true
statements. Apart from testability, scientific presentations must
also fulfill the demand of fruitfulness and economy of thought.3 1
If we compare everyday, and true, statements on weather and
wind, on the height of houses and distance to the street-car, with
modem physical theories, we soon realise that the difference is
quite as big as the difference between physics and metaphysics,
although of a different kind.
I shall not attempt to suggest what those criteria of science
are which come in addition to testability. They are less worked
through than the problems of testability, especially within the
social sciences. And the borderline between the scientifically
uninteresting, although true statements, and the scientifically
fruitful statements, is very difficult to draw.
Ross is certainly aware of these considerations. But in his
theory of valid law the attempt to make doctrinal studies of law
scientific is completely dominated by a reaction against metaphysics. Ross has on the other hand, as far as I can see, not made
any attempts to prevent the new science of law from becoming a
system of theoretically trivial and uninteresting statements, as
30 Ross, op. cit. supra note 29, at 40.

31 Cf. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 136 (1959).
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long as they are in principle testable. This new science of law
does in the first instance attempt to make a vast number of
specific predictions, not to arrive at a set of general empirical
assumptions.
I have mentioned earlier that this hardly coincides with what
legal theorists commonly conceive as their task. It may be
doubted that it would better satisfy the practical needs to develop
such a science of prediction, than to stick to the traditional
doctrinal studies. This reservation only applies, however, to the
extent that legal science is a theory on valid law. It does not
affect legal political advice to judges and others.
As far as I can see, building a theory of valid law as suggested
by Ross would lead to a social science which is neither fowl nor
fresh. This science will not be able to fulfill the traditional functions of doctrinal law, or to put it differently, this is hardly the
most fruifful way of reforming doctrinal studies from a practical
point of view. It seems, on the other hand, that the discipline
implied by the program of Ross would not develop into an
interesting theoretical social science. This outcome is probably
due to the fact that Ross from the very beginning had set himself
an insoluble task: to show that the traditional doctrinal studies
constitute a certain kind of social science, in other words, that
doctrinal law and the sociology of law could melt together into
one science. I do not believe this to be the case. Nevertheless it
is very useful to pay attention to Ross' attempt to build up such
a synthesis. Even if one cannot follow him on all the points, he
gives one of the clearest and best exposes of the various problems
that arrive in the area of contact between doctrinal law and the
sociology of law. His work makes it imperative to study judicial
behavior on a purely sociological basis.

